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ONE YEAR MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
HELD APPLICABLE TO A DRUGGIST FILLING
A PRESCRIPTION
Boudot v. Schwallie
114 Ohio App. 495, 178 N.E.2d 599 (1961)
Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries against defendant
pharmacist alleging that he was careless and negligent in filling a prescription
for a shampoo. The suit was filed one year and six months after the cause
of action accrued. Defendant demurred on the ground that the one year
malpractice statute of limitations was applicable to pharmacists.1 The trial
court sustained the demurrer, and the Court of Appeals in affirming the
ruling stated:
The very basis of her cause of action is failure on the part
of the pharmacist to exercise that degree of reasonable care employed
by those called upon by doctors to fill prescriptions for the physical
impediments of their patients. We hold that under the facts in this
case, the pharmacist was practicing a profession. . . . The practice
of the profession of pharmacy is a part and parcel of the system
of practice of modern medicine.2 (Emphasis added.)
It is not entirely clear from the opinion whether the court means the
pharmacist's negligence is classified as malpractice because he is practicing
pharmacy generally, or whether it is malpractice only in cases where a
doctor's patient has a prescription to be filled with the pharmacist serving
a necessary function in the chain of treatment. The quoted portion of the
opinion discloses the ambiguity3
The case is one of first impression in Ohio concerning the applicability
of the malpractice statute of limitations to pharmacists. In Rudman v.
Bancheri,4 a New York court held that state's malpractice statute5 applicable
to a pharmacist. However, the court made it quite clear that the statute
applied because the defendant was engaging in the unlawful practice of
medicine without a license. The malpractice statute would have applied to
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11 (1953) states in part: "An action for . . . mal-
practice . . . shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued ..
2 Boudot v. Schwallie, 114 Ohio App. 495, 178 N.E.2d 599 (1961).
3 The words "in this case" seem to limit the holding to the doctor-patient-pre-
scription-pharmacst relationship. However, the words "profession of pharmacy" indi-
cate that the court considers all pharmacists to be protected by the statute, and in
the situation where a pharmacist is negligent toward a customer who has no prescription,
his negligence would still be classified as malpractice.
4 260 App. Div. 957, 23 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1940).
5 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 50 states in part: "The following actions must be com-
menced within two years after the cause of action accrued:
1. An action to recover damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, or malpractice .... 
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anyone guilty of that offense. Thus, the decision is not authority for holding
that negligence while engaged in the practice of pharmacy is to be classified
as malpractice.
There being no specific authority in point, the question resolves itself
into determining what is meant by the word malpractice in the Ohio statute
and whether the expansion of the definition to include a pharmacist's
negligence is justified.
There are two reasons why it is believed that the Ohio statute should
not apply to pharmacists. The first is that announced in a case decided by
the New York Supreme Court which held that a nurse's negligence was
not malpractice. In Isenstein v. Malcomson, the court stated:
Malpractice is to be understood in its primary meaning, and,
as generally understood by the ordinarily intelligent and reasonably
informed person, and, in this respect, according to such common
usage and acceptance, it has continuously been intended to import
an improper treatment or culpable neglect of a patient by a physician
or surgeon.6
The second and more important reason is that in cases where Ohio courts
have construed the statute as applicable to others in the field of medicine, the
relationship has always been one where the injured person was a patienb
of the tortfeasor. For example, in holding that malpractice included a
dentist's negligence, an Ohio Court of Appeals in Cox v. Cartwright set
forth the criteria it felt necessary in order to bring the dentist within the
statute:
The practice of dentistry is regulated by statute, and high
qualifications govern the licensing of the practitioner. The licensed
dentist is a professional man who practices in a special department
of medicine .... We experience no judicial difficulty in determining
that the word malpractice as used in the statute applies to a
dentist in performing his work with a patient.8
It is true that the profession of pharmacy is also regulated by statute
and that high qualifications govern the licensing of pharmacists; however,
the principal function of the pharmacist is selling a product to a customer.
It seems unreasonable to say that pharmacists sell products to patients of
their own. Therefore, even if the holding in the principal case is limited to
the doctor-patient-prescription-pharmacist relationship, the pharmacist is not
within the criteria set forth in the Cartwright case which expanded the
coverage of the malpractice statute. Nor is this distinction between the
customer and the patient a mere play on words, for in the same case the
plaintiff also alleged that the dentist was guilty of breach of an implied
0 227 App. Div. 66, 68, 236 N.Y. Supp. 641, 643 (1929). In holding that the
malpractice statute did not apply to a surveyor, an Ohio court in Wishnek v. Gulla,
114 N.E.2d 914 (C.P. 1953), cited with approval the language of the Isenstein case.
7 The extension to attorneys is considered infra.
8 96 Ohio App. 245, 248, 121 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1953).
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warranty and the court held that no warranty existed. In so holding, the
court observed: "Indeed, it may be fairly stated that only a strained view of
the professional relationship between the dentist and his patient could class
the dentist in the category of a salesman of false teeth. ' 9 However, the
professional relationship between a pharmacist and a buyer of drugs has
all of the business characteristics of the salesman-customer transaction.
In the case of Davis v. Eubanks,10 an Ohio common pleas court ex-
tended the malpractice statute to the negligence of a nurse in administering
an injection of penicillin to the plaintiff. The court relied on the definition of
the term malpractice in Bouvier's Law Dictionary:
Bad or unskilled practice in a physician or other professional
person, whereby the health of a patient is injured, is usually called
malpractice."
Once again the plaintiff was a patient and the court found that the nurse
qualified under the term other professional person contained in the definition.
Although, the pharmacist also would qualify as a professional person, his
activities fall short of classifying him as treating patients of his own, and
he would therefore fail to qualify under the definition adopted by this court.
Emphasis has thus been placed on the definition of malpractice, the
consideration of public expectation and community understanding of the
word, and the difference in services provided by pharmacists and those of
physicians and other professional medical persons. However, if the intention
of the legislature can be ascertained, the courts are bound to follow that
intention whether based on explicit words in the statute or gained from the
history surrounding the act. For this reason, Long v. Bowersox12 is perhaps
the most important case showing that malpractice has been extended be-
yond what the legislature had in mind. In the Bowersox case, malpractice
was held to include the negligence of attorneys in dealings with their clients.
The plaintiff insisted that malpractice applied only to physicians and
surgeons. 13 The court emphasized different dictionary definitions and
then stated:
Green and Kelley's Ohio Pleading and Practice, 61; Bates'
Pleading (1st Ed.), 288; and 2 Bates' Pleading (2 Ed.), 987 de-
fined malpractice as negligence of attorneys as well as of physicians
and surgeons. . . .Green and Kelley's was in extensive use by
the Ohio Bar while Bates' Pleadings and Bates' Digest were found
in every law office in the state that made any pretense in the
practice of law.14
9 Id. at 250, 121 N.E.2d at 676.
10 83 Ohio L. Abs. 28 (C.P. 1960).
11 Id. at 31.
12 8 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 249, 19 Ohio Dec. 494 (C.P. 1909).
Is Ohio Gen. Code § 4983 prescribed a statute of limitations of one year for
libel, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and malpractice. The
present statute is substantially the same except for the addition of slander.
14 Long v. Bowersox, supra note 12, at 255, 19 Ohio Dec. at 499.
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This decision, then, helps to show what was in the minds of the legislators
when they adopted the amendment and added the word malpractice in
1894. With respect to the medical aspect of malpractice, the decision re-
inforces the contention that malpractice included only the negligence of
physicians and sugeons and that this is the common understanding of the
word.
It appears that although the court in the principal case felt that the
malpractice statute encompassed pharmacists practicing their profession
either generally or in the narrower physician-patient-prescription-pharmacist
relationship, previous court decisions dealing with dentists and nurses do
not justify this extension of the statute due to the general business and
selling characteristics of the pharmacist. Finally, the Bowersox case tends
to show that the extension is beyond community understanding of the
meaning of the word and the intention of the legislature.
